

The President's Daily Brief

December 2, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PORTUGAL

Factionalism is surfacing again within the Portuguese military as relatively conservative officers seek to sustain the momentum gained in putting down the leftist rebellion last week.

group of conservative officers--reportedly including some who played a key role in suppressing last week's rebellion--met on Saturday outside of Lisbon to discuss Portugal's political future. These officers advocate a strict division between political and military affairs, and want the other military officers to make a choice between the two.

Many of those present also reportedly oppose the policy of "forcing" socialism on the Portuguese people. This sentiment puts them in opposition to both the Antunes faction, which dominates the military's Revolutionary Council, and the Socialists, who have the largest party representation in the cabinet. Antunes and the Socialists have declared socialism to be their goal for the country.

The strength of the conservative officer faction is unknown, but it did insist on the crackdown on the left. The group aims at replacing President Costa Gomes and members of the Antunes faction before the election scheduled for next spring. The officers suspect that the Antunes faction may try to sidestep the election out of fear that the more conservative Popular Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Center will win a majority rather than the Socialists. There is little evidence at present, however, that the conservative officers have sufficient strength to pull this maneuver off.

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USSR-PLO

PLO chief Yasir Arafat appears to have broken little new ground during his visit to Moscow last week. The communique issued at the end of the visit indicates that Arafat gave no more than lip service to the idea, advanced by Moscow early in November, of reconvening the Geneva conference. The Soviets continue to withhold formal endorsement of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

The Palestinians seem to be looking to the UN to develop new momentum for their cause, while Moscow remains cool to the pursuit of Middle East issues in a forum where its influence will be diluted.

The Soviets apparently again pressed Arafat to move toward an affirmation of Israel's right to exist, but again were unsuccessful. The communiqué did say that a Middle East settlement should be achieved on the basis of UN resolutions and the UN charter. Although the Soviets can take this as implicit acknowledgment of Israel's existence, the wording is ambiguous and leaves Arafat much room for maneuver.

The communiqué criticized the second Sinai accord and castigated "certain quarters" for undermining Arab unity, but it did not mention either Sadat or the US by name.

Arafat's reception in Moscow was generally similar to that given him last spring. He did not talk with officials higher than Foreign Minister Gromyko and party secretary Ponomarev. During his previous visit, Arafat had a brief, ceremonial encounter with Brezhnev.

The situation in Lebanon and Soviet arms supplies to the fedayeen were not mentioned in the communique, but must have been dicussed. Three fedayeen leaders with military responsibilities went to Moscow with Arafat, suggesting that the Palestinians pressed for additional arms supplies

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ANGOLA

Growing publicity over South African military support for the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola is proving a political liability for those two organizations.

The attention being paid Pretoria's involvement in Angola already has caused Nigeria and Dahomey to abandon the neutrality they had assumed toward the civil conflict. Both countries have now recognized the regime established by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

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Many African nations are seriously concerned about Soviet involvement in Angola but this uneasiness is outweighed by antipathy toward South Africa.

NOTES

The <u>Israeli</u> aircraft bombings of <u>fedayeen</u> camps in northern and southern <u>Lebanon</u> on December 2 were the first such air strikes in about three months.

The strikes probably were largely in response to a fedayeen attack launched from Syria in late November. They presumably also reflect Israel's unhappiness over the action by the Security Council president inviting PLO participation in the Middle East debate in January.

Spanish King Juan Carlos appears to have won his first battle to get his own men into the government.

He is expected to name Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda as President of the Cortes--the Spanish parliament--and as president of the powerful advisory body, the Council of State. Fernandez-Miranda was Franco's choice as tutor to the King and is expected to be responsive to what Juan Carlos wants. In his new offices he will play an important role in promoting the King's choice for prime minister should Juan Carlos decide to replace Carlos Arias. Fernandez-Miranda also will be in a position to sign a number of executive decisions which may permit the King to sidestep some of the constitutional restraints on his freedom of action.

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Saudi Arabia's initial reaction to a reported North Yemeni - Soviet arms deal has been predictably harsh.

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Ambassador Akins has suggested that the arms deal might still be reversible, and that Fahd may yet move to conclude the long-delayed agreement with North Yemen to provide Saudi financial assistance for the purchase of US and other western arms. Hamdi repeatedly has stated that, given a choice, he prefers to have Western arms and the good will of the Saudis.

Saudi Arabia has refused an International Monetary Fund request to commit an additional \$480 million to the Fund's oil facility, which provides loans to oil importers facing financing problems.

Jidda made an initial commitment of \$1.2 billion in June and agreed in October to contribute \$300 million more. Saudi Arabia is already supplying 35 percent of the facility's funds this year, but its failure to go beyond \$1.5 billion could make the fund less able to ease balance-of-payments problems among oil importers early next year. The Saudis' decision is a product of their displeasure with the operations of the facility since its inception in 1974. They would like a greater voice in the administration of the fund.

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Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo, leader of a major faction of the country's black nationalists, signed a joint "declaration of intent" on December 1 to begin negotiations for a constitutional settlement of their dispute.

The final details for the conference, including the date that talks will begin, are to be worked out next week. The declaration assures Nkomo's team of negotiators immunity from arrest and freedom to enter and leave Rhodesia. Two of Nkomo's leading rivals, Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, will doubtless be excluded from the talks and are likely to denounce the declaration.

Nkomo can apparently count on the support of Zambian President Kaunda and Botswanan President Khama. Tanzanian President Nyerere may take a neutral position toward the dissident factions. Nkomo hopes to obtain the support of Mozambican President Machel, who currently favors Muzorewa and Sithole.

The Somali armed forces last week carried out a combined land, sea, and air exercise ; the exercise simulated operations in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

Somali President Siad has publicly stated—most recently to a visiting French journalist—that he would accept an independent territory of Afars and Issas as long as it is neither pro—Ethiopian nor anti—Somali. According to an Arab military attaché in Mogadiscio, Soviet advisers in Somalia have warned Siad not to move militarily against the French territory until its independence is proclaimed. They have advised him that once the proclamation is made, he can press the Issas, who are a Somali tribe, to call for Somalia's intervention on the ground that the Issas must be protected from their traditional enemies, the Afars.

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